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THE WINDOW
VICTORY THROUGH AIR POWER?
F"'Ill S".it::e-rlutlll Ice have received Ihc fullowillg ra'i Ie of fI boo].' whir"
/'0/1 tlrOll,'c(/ IIlllch i fllercst ill ... '/11 ricCl,-K, .H,
IN 1030 the most, famous theoretician (1fair wllrfltre, t.he ItAtiian General Giuliu
Douhct, died in Rome at the age of
ixt. '- ne, During the (;reat \\'ar he was
an officer of t.he JtaLian Ueneral :)tafT, For
hi criticism of huh"s conduct of tlte WHr
he wu' condemned 'to onc y(·ur's imprison-
ment. Later this punishment was rCIKinded,
In JU2J he was ma.de 1.1 general. In th
sam' year he publishcd his famous book on
air doruillation, lJomillio de/I' A ria, He fol.
lowed up hi book with many articles in the
Rivis/,(£ • IerOIlG Ull:ca , General Balbo's magu-
zine, in which he continued to fight for hil'!
ideas, Douhet was a fanatic who frequently
disregaJ'ded technical quostionR, His writings
cau d endle s dis 'ussionl'! which contributRd
much toward the dllrifieation of the problems
of air warfare, Indeed, these discussions did
not cease evcn after his death,
Recently a. book appcllred in the United
States which attempt.'! to utilize the ex-
periences gained so far in the present war
and which propounds ideas that in many
respects are I;trongly reminiscent of Douhet's
Domil/io dell' A ria, The book is entitled
Vic/or.'! Through A ir Power, and the intercst
it aroused from the very beginnjng seems to
be gro\\ing steadily,
Its author is Alexander foic\'crsky, who has
n rcputa tion of long stunding fll~~n' aero-
nautical expert.s, He was born in Russia
in 1~!J4, In I!)l-! he tx-camc a Iieutenltnt in
the Russian NIl"y, and after hR"ing :;('rH~d
Horne time wit.h n. destroyer f1ot.iBa he went.
over to the na"1\1 air ,~rm, As a pursuit
and fighter pilot he came through man,v
811cce!\sflll battle'!. Because of his kdllliclll
knowlrdge and ability he wa>! then I;cnt to
tht' United Stat('!\ with the HlIssilln nU"nl
lind air mi"l;ion. ',Vhile he was !let,ive in
thi" capacity, till' Tsari~t Empire collapsed,
He remained in tlte States where ht' partic-
ipated in tht, de"l'1('rJlTIent of the American
air arm in "ariuu" important otTic-ial po",j-
tion!'!, finally acquiring tIll' rank of an
American major, :1 n HI31 he founded the
Sc\'ersky Aircraft Corpol'lltion (the fore-
runner of the present Rcpu blic Aviat ion
C'orpomt,ion), which produced some of t,he
beHt American jlllr"uit planes,
TilE El'1l0PEAN 'KAl,~:IDOSCOI'E
In his book he tcU. n" about hil; experienc-
es in Europe shortly before the prescnt war,
when he vi"itcd various countrie to nc~o­
tiate the deljvcry of American planes, He
describes the impressivc sizc and the exeeBent
organization of the (;erman air force ami
a"illtion indu try. He claims that the
Cerman aircraft modl·l:; were a.lready fixcd
in their design some year before the war
in ordpr to permit unlimited mass product,ion.
Prewar conditions in Franco are revealed in
aU their glaring inefficiency. He desoribes
the prejudices against which he lL8 a foreiWl
industrialjst had to fight there, ll,nd the
corrupt,ion which he encountered at every
step, from the highc8t to the 10weRt. He
dc-scribes how the re ults of official tel'<ts
were tam pered wi th and forged till the
desired result was arrived at and the foreign
plane appeared inferior to the French one.
He describes the dil;order ami maladminis-
tmtion in the various fact.ories as well n,., in
the entire industry. In contrast to thjs, he
has more favorable things to say a.bollt the
Britillh aircraft indust,ry and the Hpirit per-
rn(·at.ing it before the war; but there, too,
he points 1.,0 various deficiencics which he
discovered, Hc regardR tbe lH'ronautieal in-
tlu'tr" of AmericlI, with whil'h he should be
thoro-ughly familiar, through very critical
eye~: and some of the (L('('USllt ions he brings
ngain,.,t the leading l'ircle uf th Unit ~I
Statl's are of a serious na.ture,
ELE\'E~ "Ill SCII'LE ,
'.1'11(' ('""CI1C(' of his book i eOlltainc-c! in
the I'<ixth chaptl'r, in which he draws lip
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eleven principles which he claims t.o be the
lessons to be learned from the present war
and which he proves by examples.
The axiom of modern warfllre, he states,
is tllat no military actions are posstble,
either on land or at sea, until air supremacy
has been won. As examples he takes the
campaign in Norway, then Dunkirk, and the
transfer of the three German warships
cha.rnhoTsl, Prinz Eugen, and Gneisenau
from the port of Brest in :February 1942.
Pointing to the fact that Great Britain,
with her vastly superior fleet, has not yet
been able to risk an attack on those coasts
of the European continent which are de-
fended by the German air force, he main-
tains that the navies have lost in importance
as means of strategic offensi..·es. He also
states that air power cannot be defeated by
any other weapon and that it must be
overcome from the air, antiaircraft defense
being only a palliative.
One contention which will be opposed by
many is contained in the sixth principle,
namely, that the effective range of the air
force must cover the whole extent of the
theater of war. In this connection he also
raises the demand for special means of
transport and supply for the air force, more
particularly for such means as correspond to
its mobility and speed, i.e., transport planes,
which could carry the entire supplies for the
air formations at the front.
In another important section he demands
that aircraft models be so specialized that
they correspond specifically to the require-
ments of a plalwed campaign.
Seversky also champions the theory that
nowadays air blockade is not only more
useful than naval blockade: it is the only
effective type of blockade. This would
become apparent as soon as the range of
action of airplanes had been increased
sufficiently.
CAN TUf;Y T.ilE IT!
As regards the question which is now 80
much under discussion, namely, whether
chTilian morale can be broken by bombing
raids on residential and economic centers,
he limits himself to stating that the in-
discriminate bombing of whole city districts
is without value. He believes that the
desired effect may, if at all, be achieved only
by cutting off ..ita! supplies through the
destruotion of power plants, gas works, and
water works. In this he differs considerably
from Douhet, who had assumed that large-
scale indiscriminate bombing attacks on
populated centers would suffice to break an
enemy country's will of resistance anu bring
about the collap'e of it army.
Today neither one nor the other has been
proved right. Only one thing is clear: that
a. civilian population which has been properly
instructed and which has been imbued with
a strong \\ill of resistance does not succumb
so easily to air raids. This is shown by
the experiences of the Allies with their
terror raids on European cities.
Seversky agrees with Douhet in that the
air force is able to bring about the decision;
consequently the army and navy should be
given minor tasks in comparison t.o the air
force. Incidentally, his presentation is more
entertaining than Doubet's writings, as hc i8
in a position to give countless examples from
the last few years for his theories. Bllt
although Seversky's book contains many
interesting ideas worth discussing, it doee
not represent an actual theory of air warfare.
With these limitations it may be permissible
to call Seversky a successor to Doubet.
•
His practical significance, however, is to
be found elsewhere. On the basis of his
theories he stipulates that the United States
should have a fleet of huge bombers which
can reach any point of the globe within a
radius of 8,000 kilometers. This would
make it possible to carry out raids from
Newfoundland as far a Poland, from New
York as far as Le Havre, from Hawaii all
over Japan, and from Algiers as far as the
northern coast of Finland. This, according
to his opinion, would make it possible to
bring about a decision in the war by hea\'y
raids on the industrial and military estab-
lishments of the enemy.
It is by no means impossible that his book
may give a renewed impulse to those circles
in the United States which have been
emphasizing the superiority of the air force
over the navy and army. Thus it is quite
feasible that Seversl..-y may influenco the
present air policy of the United States and
even that of the whole Anglo.Saxon group
of powers. It will be interesting to observe
how Scversky's theories stand up against
the practical application of new theories 011
air warfare which have undoubtedly beclI
developed in the Axis countries during the
five years to have elapsed since Seven;ky's
last visit to Europe.-G. U.
